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You can download the following document in Adobe PDF format here. (Internet Explorer users right-click and click "Save Target As". Netscape Navigator users right-click and click "Save Link As".) Thursday 15th October 2004
If Sydney's land is so valuable, and rail uses land with greater efficiency than roads, why does Sydney rely so much on roads? With so many demands on Government funds, it's important to get value for money from our transport systems. In economic terms, value for money means rate of return. Do we get a good return for the resources invested in our roads and railways? One of these resources is publicly owned land. Sydney land, as any home owner knows, is very valuable(1). Since land is so valuable, we should ensure:
Is this what our Governments do? No. It is difficult to find an accurate estimate of the area covered by roads in Sydney. But it is plain that the area covered by roads is substantial, and that covered by railways is much less. In fact, a study by the Institute for Sustainable Futures in 1999 concluded that the value of land under roads in Sydney was 22 times higher than the value of land under railways(2). Yet railways have a far greater carrying capacity than roads. That is rail's great economic advantage. Rail delivers far more passengers, or tonnes of freight, per square metre used than any other mode of transport.(3) So we have a paradox: if Sydney's land is so valuable, and rail uses land with much more efficiency than roads, why does Sydney rely so much on roads? The reason is that our economic assessment processes are not nearly as rational as we would like to believe. While several examples from individual project assessments(4) could be presented, this article considers the overall picture. One reason Sydney relies on roads is that users do not pay to use transport corridors.
Accordingly there is no connection at all between the value of our transport corridors, and the price we pay to use them. Users do not pay for the use of transport corridors. Use is subsidised by the taxpayer. Since Governments are so concerned about transport subsidies, why doesn't the Government require a rate of return on the land the community has invested in those corridors? If the Government used taxpayers' money to acquire an office block, and then allowed people to use the offices without paying rent, it would rightly be condemned as wasting an asset. But this is exactly what we do with transport corridors. Is that sensible management of a community resource worth billions? Not only is there no method of collecting the rent on transport corridors, there is no official recognition that this is necessary or desirable. Those who determine our transport policy choose to ignore the issue.
The prevailing orthodoxy is to regard the land in existing corridors as a 'sunk cost' which can be disregarded. A minority view is that the use of land for transport corridors imposes a cost on the community in the form of the foregone opportunity to use the land for another, more profitable purpose(10). This argument assumes that public land is available for members of the public as a transport corridor, so the only real cost is the 'opportunity cost' involved in not putting the land to a better use. As a cost imposed on others, it is regarded as an externality. What you measure, and how you measure it, depends on the purpose of the measurement. It is hard to see any purpose which would justify treating valuable land as an irrelevant 'sunk cost'. Where the purpose is to examine the relationship of the transport sector to the economy as a whole; for example, when the question is whether public land should remain as a road or become a park or a hospital site; then the 'opportunity cost' approach to land may be justifiable. But when the purpose is to better manage the transport system, both the 'sunk cost' and 'opportunity cost' approaches ignore the obvious - you cannot provide transport without land, so the cost of making that land available is a direct cost of providing the service. It is a direct cost incurred by the producer which is not, at present, passed on to the consumer. The failure to collect the rent on the transport corridors has these consequences: 1. The supplier of transport corridors, the Government, has no effective mechanism for rationing the private use of public space. 2. The Government has no economic incentive to maximise its rate of return on the land invested in transport corridors, by switching to the optimum mode for each route. 3. Users have no economic incentive to make efficient use of roads. All this favours the mode which is the least efficient user of land - namely travel by private car. As a result, Sydney has more roads than is economically optimal, or ecologically sustainable. We are not getting value for money on the land we've invested in roads and railways, because we don't count all the dollars being spent on transport. We simply forget about collecting the rent on the transport corridors. If this city wants a rational, sustainable transport system, the users of transport corridors must pay the rent for their use of the corridor. How the rent would be collected will be dealt with in subsequent articles. Written by Philip Howell for the Rail Now Campaign Inc.
Footnotes
While these figures are indicative only, and of course omit freight, note that the motorways referred to each have 2 or 3 lanes, yet move substantially fewer people per hour than a single railway track. (4) Some examples are presented in a paper available from the author, "Economically Sustainable Transport", by Philip Howell, 20th October 2001. (5) Recommendation 8 on p.30 of "Aspects of the NSW Rail Access Regime", Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, April 1999. (6) The relevant accounting standard, AAS 27, states in paragraph 108 that local governments "may elect ... not to recognise land under roads as an asset in their statement of financial position" until the end of 2006. (7) Section 5(1) of the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) gives the public rights to pass along public roads subject to such restrictions as are set out in legislation. Since no legislation authorises councils imposing a charge for the use of roads, they could not do so without infringing the right given in section 5(1). Under the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), councils can raise money in any of the following ways:
(8) IPART increased fares for years on the basis that rail users were being subsidised too much, without ever identifying a criterion by which an appropriate level of subsidy could be determined. It ignored the author's submission dated 14th April 2000 that the logical starting point for setting the level of cost recovery from rail, is the level of cost recovery from roads. If the two are not equated, the allocation of resources will be distorted in favour of the more heavily subsidised mode. (9) Professor Tom Parry conducted the Ministerial Inquiry into Sustainable Transport in New South Wales. Chapter 8 of his final report, dated December 2003, entitled "Charging for Road Use", (pp.72-82) acknowledged that road users do not pay to use roads, and that this disadvantaged public transport. However, at no stage did the Professor acknowledge the rent, or rate of return, foregone on the transport corridor as one of the costs. His whole discussion is about pricing roads so that users pay the full cost of externalities - congestion, accident costs and pollution. For Professor Parry, the land is a 'sunk cost' which can be ignored. (10) See the discussion paper commissioned by the NSW Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, "Subsidies and the Social Costs and Benefits of Public Transport", by the Centre for International Economics, March 2001, pp.18-21, available at www.ipart.nsw.gov.au. | |||||||||||||||||||