1st July, 2003

1. The Government cannot be trusted to measure the benefits of the railway

1.1 The economic evaluation of the Parramatta Rail Link assumed the life of the rail line to be 40 years with no residual value accruing at the end of the evaluation period.

1.2 The economic evaluation assumed that patronage on the line would remain constant after the 15th year of operation. The Rail Link will not have reached full capacity by that time. Full capacity would be 15 trains per hour, whereas the EIS assumed that by 2021 there would be only 8 trains per hour between Parramatta and Epping and 12 per hour between Epping and Chatswood. By contrast, the assessment of the Orbital assumes patronage keeps growing for 35 years.

1.3 The Rail Link economic evaluation does not measure the extent to which private land will appreciate in value because of the link. Though economists readily acknowledge that railways improve the value of land nearby, this benefit has simply been ignored.

1.4 The Government decided the railway should not carry freight. Any freight moving between the main north and west lines must firstly travel far to the east, to a section of the line which is so congested that freight trains are not permitted to pass through it during the peak periods. Imagine the benefits in freight movement if the railway was designed to carry freight between Parramatta and Epping.

Economists' assumptions and a short-sighted decision on freight have lead to the benefits of the railway being under-estimated.

(Source: See the Parramatta Rail Link Briefing Paper within the 'Major Transport Projects' section on our web site.)

2. The Government cannot be trusted to accurately disclose costs

2.1 The Government has never released a breakdown of the costs of the project.

2.2 When it deferred the Epping-Parramatta section of the line in March 2001, it attributed its decision to cost blowouts, but did not disclose in which categories costs had increased. We are expected to take Government assertions at face value.

2.3 It is probable that the Government has hidden Transitway costs in the costing of the railway. Parramatta station will house an interchange large enough to cater for 90-110 bus movements each way per hour, to be built under the existing rail line but above the proposed new line. The cost of the interchange has not to date been included in the costing of the transitways, (though a further FOI request may clarify the position).

2.4 Three FOI applications seeking details of the alleged cost blowout in the Parramatta Rail Link have been unsuccessful.

2.5 Mr Costa has given only a one line indicative costing for his 4 alternative options for completing the rail link. No supporting detail has been issued.

(Sources: Rail Link & Transitway Overview Reports & EIS, various media stories around March 2001, personal discussion with John Smith of DOT in May 2001, freedom of information requests to SRA, RIC, Dept of Transport and Treasury.)

3. The Government cannot be trusted to reveal the real reasons for its decisions
3.1 The Parramatta Rail Link was 'sold' to the West as a measure to provide for Western Sydney, but really it was a Cityrail network management measure.

3.2 The deferral of half the project in March 2001 was attributed to cost blowouts, but we now know the Christie Report must then have been nearing completion. Christie asserted that other measures could provide many of the network enhancements offered by the Parramatta Rail Link.

(Note: Christie nevertheless acknowledged that even with the full Parramatta Rail Link the combined capacity of the west, north and north shore lines to the city would be exhausted by 2015).

3.3 Mr Costa defended his recent decision by reference to the Airport Rail Link, calling that line a disaster. But that line has allowed 24 additional services to the city from the south-west between 7-9am on weekdays. It has triggered the massive re-development planned for Green Square. If use of the line as a link to the airport has been disappointing, this can be attributed to the opening of the eastern distributor around the same time as the railway. The Parramatta Rail Link faces no such problem.

3.4 The Government is now querying the benefits of the Rail Link. But before a decision was made to build a railway from Parramatta - Chatswood, 12 other alternative plans were examined. The rail link was found to be the most economically beneficial. We suggest the Government is really concerned with overall capital costs.

(Sources: Media reports when the EIS was released, Christie Report p.44, Cityrail timetable, Economic Evaluation by PCIE in EIS Working Papers, Airport Rail Link EIS).